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 Problems and Conclusions 
The New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
Its Aims, Their Limits and the Challenges for 
Associations of People of Turkish Origin and 
Decision-makers in Germany 
Why is it often so difficult in this country to make a 
balanced assessment of the interest of the Turkish 
government in people in Germany who originated in 
Turkey? The reason for this is clearly on the one hand 
the scepticism of many decision-makers in Germany 
in relation to the transnational connections of people 
originating in Turkey, which are regarded as an 
obstacle to their integration into German society. And 
on the other hand there is widespread concern about 
“externally controlled penetration” by their country 
of origin, Turkey. In its judgement of the Turkish 
diaspora and the diaspora policy pursued by Ankara, 
German politicians are often influenced by the spectre 
of a “fifth column” or “Trojan horse”, consequently 
losing sight of the integrative aspects of both the dias-
pora as a way of life and of diaspora policy. Political 
decision-makers and institutions should rid them-
selves of such attitudes and recognise the role of the 
transnational links to Turkey of people who origi-
nated there in mediating and building bridges. The 
main problem is not that the Turkish government 
takes up the cause of these people in Germany, but 
that it promotes conservative social values and a col-
lective identity marked by religion that not only 
arouses the scepticism of German decision-makers but 
also at the same time contributes to reinforcing the 
cultural fragmentation of the Turkish diaspora. 
The course of the German debate until now about 
the involvement of the Turkish government for people 
in Germany who originated in Turkey and for their 
political activities shows that there is an urgent need 
to view the problem with objectivity and in its histori-
cal setting. There are two prerequisites for this: an 
analysis of the relationship of the new Turkish dias-
pora policy to the integration requirements of Ger-
man society and the efforts to integrate made by 
people from Turkey in Germany; and a realistic assess-
ment of the capacity of the Turkish government to 
control and guide. Thus first of all the roots of Ankara’s 
new diaspora policy will be summarised in this paper, 
the socio-political and economic drivers of this strat-
egy will be illuminated and the relevant central 
institutions for this purpose will then be introduced. 
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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
Finally the reactions of Turkish migrant organisations 
to Turkish diaspora policy will be discussed. 
Regardless of the subject involved, interventions 
by Turkish politicians in matters that concern people 
from Turkey in Germany are normally subject to criti-
cism in the German media and by German politicians, 
and cause friction in German-Turkish relations. Con-
trary to widespread assessments, the increasing inter-
est of the Turkish government in people from Turkey 
who live in Germany is by no means economic in 
origin, but is part of a political strategy that aims 
to build up and strengthen diaspora organisations 
and extend their scope of action. It can therefore be 
assumed that Ankara will continue to focus on the 
Turkish diaspora in Germany, which will result in 
both challenges for the foreign policy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany and in opportunities for inte-
gration policy. The aim that the former Turkish prime 
minister, now president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pro-
poses to people from Turkey in Germany, to make 
better use of education opportunities and to make 
efforts to improve their social status, to take an active 
part in the life of society and also in the formation of 
political attitudes, can only be achieved if those who 
are being addressed adopt modern types of behaviour 
and habits of openness. The decision-makers and insti-
tutions in Germany that are engaged with such issues 
should therefore be open for cooperation with the 
Turkish diaspora and the Turkish government, and at 
the same time should press it to respect the autonomy 
of migrants’ associations and not to further reinforce 
cultural fragmentation within the Turkish diaspora in 
Germany through its policy. 
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Driving Forces and Central Institutions of the New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
Driving Forces and Central Institutions of the 
New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
 
With his self-confident appearance in Cologne in 2008, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Turkish prime minister, 
triggered a wave of criticism and outrage in Germany. 
In his speech he condemned assimilation as a “crime 
against humanity”1, calling on people in Germany 
who originated in Turkey to maintain their relation-
ship to Turkey and to Turkish culture, and to work in 
the interests of Turkey. Little notice was taken, how-
ever, of his appeal to people from Turkey to learn the 
German language, to be active politically and to make 
better use of the opportunities provided by the Ger-
man education system. Erdoğan, according to the ver-
dict of an author in Spiegel whose view can undoubted-
ly be regarded as representative of the media response, 
was using for his own ends the community in Ger-
many of people from Turkey with his “aggressive 
diaspora policy”, behaving like a “substitute chancel-
lor” and claiming to “work for the integration of 
Turkish immigrants and their children in Germany”. 
In fact, according to the Spiegel author, he was achiev-
ing the opposite of this.2 
Erdoğan’s second speech in Cologne on 24 May 
2014 also led to vehement reactions amongst German 
politicians. The occasion for the visit was officially the 
tenth anniversary of the Union of European Turkish 
Democrats (UETD), but in reality the election in Turkey, 
then approaching, of the state president, in which 
Turkish citizens living abroad were allowed to vote 
and to whom Erdoğan had announced his – as is now 
known, successful – candidature. In 2007 Armin 
1  “Erdoğans Rede erzürnt deutsche Politiker”, in: Die Welt, 
28 February 2011. On the subject of assimilation Erdoğan 
said among other things the following: “I understand very 
well the sensitivity that you show towards assimilation. 
No-one can expect you to tolerate assimilation. No-one can 
expect you to submit to assimilation. Because assimilation 
is a crime against humanity. You should be aware of this”, 
quoted from “Das sagte Ministerpräsident Erdogan in Köln”, 
Die Welt, 11 February 2008, http://www.welt.de/debatte/ 
article1660510/Das-sagte-Ministerpraesident-Erdogan-in-
Koeln.html (accessed 9 January 2014). Erdoğan’s allegation 
of assimilation is directed against the German policy of 
integration, which is critical of the relations of people of 
Turkish origin in Germany to Turkey. 
2  Maximilian Popp, “Ersatzkanzler in Ankara”, Der Spiegel, 
no. 19 (2013): 36–7. 
Laschet, the former CDU integration minister of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, had already criticised the intention 
of the Turkish government to give the right to vote to 
Turkish citizens abroad as “damaging to integration 
policy”.3 What are the reasons for this increasing 
interest by the government in Ankara in people from 
Turkey in Germany, and the criticism that it thus 
arouses in Germany? What reasons, motives and 
driving forces can be identified for this interest and 
for the scepticism of the German side? 
The new Turkish diaspora policy must be regarded 
in the context of three developments. Firstly, the emer-
gence of a transnational diaspora in Germany, in 
other European states and in the USA. The population 
in Germany of people who originated in Turkey can 
be described as a “diaspora” because its members differ 
from the majority in society in terms of their identity, 
their way of life and because of the disadvantages that 
they experience and feel. The involvement and strat-
egy of the Turkish government towards this commu-
nity in Germany can be described as a “diaspora policy” 
because their purpose is to build up and strengthen 
Turkish associations and organisations and to extend 
their scope for action.4 Secondly, the new Turkish dias-
pora policy is related to the establishment of a new 
state elite and the implementation of a new discourse 
on modernity and Muslim national identity in Turkey. 
Thirdly, the new diaspora policy needs to be related to 
the context of the re-orientation of Turkish foreign 
policy, which would possibly not have taken place 
without shifts of power in society. 
3  A politician of Turkish origin, Cem Özdemir from the 
Green Party, also regards “voting rights abroad” for second- 
and third-generation people of Turkish origin as “scarcely 
helpful” for the purpose of “arriving in modern times”; see 
“Warum das Heim-Wahlrecht der Türken die Integration 
behindert”, Spiegel online, 28 March 2007, http://www.spiegel. 
de/politik/ausland/diaspora-warum-das-heim-wahlrecht-der-
tuerken-die-integration-behindert-a-474170.html (accessed 
18 April 2013). 
4  Johann Heiss and Maria Six-Hohenbalken, “Diaspora”, in 
F. Kreff et al., Lexikon der Globalisierung (Bielefeld, 2011), 44f.; 
Alan Gamlen, Diaspora Engagement Policies. What Are They,  and 
What Kinds of States Use Them (Oxford: University of Oxford, 
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, 2006). 
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Driving Forces and Central Institutions of the New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
Before the principal driving forces and interests of 
the current diaspora policy are discussed, a historical 
review of the early stages of this strategy is helpful. 
Retrospective – historical stages of 
Turkish diaspora policy 
From the 1960s Turkey promoted the migration of its 
citizens to Europe, partly in order to relieve pressure 
on its own labour market and thus to prevent possible 
socio-political tension in this way. The government in 
Ankara assumed at that time that the “guest workers” 
would return to Turkey with new skills and qualifica-
tions after staying in Western Europe for a few years 
and so contribute to alleviating the shortage of skilled 
workers.5 Through a largely defensive policy of influ-
ence and identity, the Turkish governments of those 
years attempted to preserve and strengthen the links 
of migrant workers to their homeland and their 
loyalty to the Turkish state. The purpose was to pre-
vent citizens living abroad from assimilating to the 
cultures of the countries in question and breaking 
with Turkey and “Turkish culture”. As the German 
government also expected Turkish workers and their 
families to return during this phase, it did not coun-
teract this relationship to their home country. 
In its assistance for migrant workers originating 
from Turkey, until the 1980s the Turkish state con-
centrated on giving expert advice in pensions and 
other social matters in Turkish consulates through 
social attachés who were employed especially for this 
purpose. In 1984 the Turkish Islamic Union of the 
State Office of Religious Affairs (DİTİB:) was registered 
as a society in Cologne. In this way Ankara extended 
its portfolio of services towards Turks living in Ger-
many by attending to the maintenance of religious 
practices. 
The economic dimension of the Turkish policy of 
influence and identity primarily consisted in motivat-
ing Turkish citizens working in Germany to invest 
their savings in their home country. 
The late 1970s were marked by a change in the per-
ception of migrant workers from Turkey by Turkish 
politicians. Firstly they became conscious of the fact 
that “guest workers” would permanently remain in 
various European states, when they brought remain-
5  Sabri Sayarı, “Migration Policies of Sending Countries”, 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
no. 485 (1986): 87–97. 
ing members of their family to join them instead of 
returning to Turkey. Secondly, as a result of transfers 
of foreign currency, which accounted for a consider-
able proportion of Turkish gross national product at 
that time, it was realised that the continuing resi-
dence in European countries of people originating in 
Turkey could be more advantageous to Turkey than 
their return. 
The year 1982 represented an even more important 
break with the past: by means of a new law on nation-
ality, the government in Ankara permitted Turkish 
nationals to acquire a further nationality (dual nation-
ality). Furthermore, the aims and obligations of “dias-
pora policy”, i.e. to represent the interests of people 
from Turkey abroad and to strengthen their ties to 
Turkey, were given constitutional status.6 
In the 1980s the focus of the Turkish state with 
respect to migrant workers shifted from economic to 
political matters. Two new areas of activity made this 
clear.7 The first is that the Turkish government intro-
duced a practice of coordinated representation of its 
interests vis-à-vis the states in which migrant workers 
resided, local authorities and other local state insti-
tutions. Secondly it now mobilised Turkish citizens 
abroad in matters that affected the “national inter-
ests” of Turkey and made efforts to involve migrants 
in its conflicts with Islamist, Kurdish national and 
radical left-wing groups, which for their part – this 
applies above all to the radical left-wing groups and 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – attempted to use 
the organisations that they controlled to mobilise 
people from Turkey against the military coup of 12 
September 1980. For this purpose, in the late 1980s 
the government in Ankara encouraged the establish-
ment of coordinating committees, which operated as 
quasi umbrella organisations of nationalist, religious 
and conservative associations as well as the ultra-
nationalist Idealist Associations, which stood close to the 
Party of the Nationalist Movement (MHP). In this way 
it was intended to combine all forces that were willing 
to promote the “national interests” of Turkey in Ger-
many by influencing the politics of the Federal Repub-
6  O. Can Ünver, “Changing Diaspora Politics of Turkey and 
Public Diplomacy”, Turkish Policy Quarterly 12, no. 1 (2013): 183 
and 184. See also idem, 35 Jahre Zeitzeuge der Migration und der 
Bürokratie (Turkish), (Ankara, 2008). 
7  Özge Bilgili and Melissa Siegel, Understanding the Changing 
Role of the Turkish Diaspora, UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 
39/2011 (Maastricht: United Nations University/Maastricht 
Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and 
Technology [UNU-MERIT], September 2010). 
SWP Berlin 
The New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
October 2014 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
The development of a transnational diaspora originating in Turkey 
lic. While the institution Türkische Gemeinde in 
Deutschland (TGD; Turkish Community in Germany) 
tended towards a neutral position, the “publicity 
work” of organisations close to the PKK, for example, 
in Germany and other European states aimed among 
other things at influencing decision-makers there 
for the Kurdish cause. For this purpose they made 
alliances with German parties and political group-
ings.8 In the late 1980s and early 1990s the principal 
aim of Turkey was therefore to thwart the attempts 
of the PKK and other radical left-wing groups to 
“undermine” loyalty to the state. 
In the 1990s the term “Euro-Turks”9 (“Avrupa 
Türkleri”) gained currency in the Turkish language. 
This expressed the idea that the permanent residence 
in Europe outside Turkey of people from Turkey was 
now a generally recognised fact. Institutionally this 
paradigm change was accompanied by the foundation 
of the Committee for Citizens Abroad.10 Two aims or 
intentions lay at the heart of Turkish diaspora policy 
in this decade: the successful integration of all people 
from Turkey in the countries that received them, and 
support of migrants in their demands for cultural 
rights. The Turkish government’s conception of “inte-
gration” was, however, very narrow. In the 1980s and 
1990s it was confined to the inclusion of people from 
Turkey in the social structure of the states to which 
they migrated; adaptation to the culture of those 
countries or to national values and traditions there 
continued to be rejected. Turkish diaspora policy 
attached importance to integration in social policy, 
because Turkish politicians and civil servants had 
realised that lack of adaptation in this area would 
restrict the scope of action of Turkish foreign policy 
and lead to tension between Turkey and the other 
states concerned.11 In this context, in 1995 the state 
president at the time, Süleyman Demirel, appealed to 
people from Turkey in Europe to take citizenship of 
the countries in which they lived. A year later Ankara 
reduced the legal obstacles to renouncing Turkish 
citizenship.12 
8  Canan Atilgan, Türkische Diaspora in Deutschland. Chance oder 
Risiko für die deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen (Hamburg, 2002), 219. 
9  Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, Euro Turks: A Bridge or a 
Breach between Turkey and the European Union (Brussels, 2005). 
10  Official website of YTB, http://www.ytb.gov.tr/index.php/ 
yurtdisi-vatandaslar-danisma-kurulu.html (accessed 4 Feb-
ruary 2014). 
11  Atılgan, Türkische Diaspora (see note 8), 153f. and 166ff. 
12  Law no. 4112 of 7 June 1995 gave to former Turkish 
citizens who had renounced Turkish citizenship with official 
All in all, Turkish diaspora policy was mainly con-
cerned with three areas of activity in the 1990s. Firstly 
it was directed towards combating the activities of 
“extremist” or “radical” political organisations that 
constituted a threat to security. In doing so it relied 
heavily on the coordinating committees, which were 
publicly criticised in Germany for their strict orien-
tation to Turkish national culture and rejection of an 
“independent German-Turkish culture”. Secondly, 
diaspora policy was intended to reinforce the demands 
of people originating in Turkey vis-à-vis the countries 
of residence. Thirdly, its task was to retain influence on 
Turks living in Germany (and other European states) 
and their organisations. In the 1990s the focus of 
attention of migrants’ associations shifted from their 
origins to migration-specific issues, though without 
loss of interest in their home country. This is evident 
in, for example, the appeals of the Islamische Gemein-
de (Islamic Community) Millî Görüş (IGMG) to its 
members to take German citizenship, learn the Ger-
man language and take part in German politics.13 
The development of a transnational diaspora 
originating in Turkey 
In 1961 an agreement was made between Germany 
and Turkey for the recruitment of Turkish workers 
that had unforeseen consequences for both sides, 
because it resulted in migration that continues to 
this day.14 Similar recruitment agreements were later 
made with Belgium, Austria (1964), the Netherlands 
(1967) and France (1973). From the 1970s Turkish 
workers also sought employment in Arab states, and 
after the collapse of the Communist bloc and the 
Soviet Union a further region for migration for Turk-
permission rights to stay in Turkey and to acquire property, 
etc., rights that were not granted to non-citizens of Turkey. 
13  Oğuz Üçüncü (secretary general of IGMG at the time of 
the interview) emphasises that the focus of the work of IGMG 
is in Germany, although there continues to be interest in 
Turkey: “I have to have a living relationship to my homeland. 
There continue to be many things that affect me, that I wish 
to influence” (interview on 29 October 2013). The develop-
ment was similar in other umbrella organisations. Cf. Betigül 
E. Argun, Turkey in Germany: The Transnational Sphere of Deutsch-
kei (New York and London, 2003). 
14  Previously there had been migration for work and edu-
cation during the First World War from the Ottoman Empire 
to the German Empire, and migration of exiles and highly 
qualified persons from German to Turkey during the Nation-
al Socialist period. 
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Driving Forces and Central Institutions of the New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
ish workers opened up in Russia, Ukraine, the Turkish 
republics and later Romania and Poland.15 Today more 
than five million Turkish citizens live outside Turkey: 
approximately four million in Western Europe, 30,000 
in North America, 20,000 in the Middle East and 
15,000 in Australia.16 
Germany is the country with the largest number 
of people originating in Turkey globally. Between 1961 
and the 1990s, more than four million people came 
from Turkey to Germany. About half of them returned 
to Turkey. Of the three million such persons in Ger-
many, according to the Migrationsbericht 2012 (Migra-
tion Report), some 1.6 million are Turkish citizens and 
approximately 1.4 million have German nationality. 
In half a century the profile of mobility between 
Germany and Turkey has changed greatly. Currently 
German-Turkish migration consists not only of family 
migration, which has become less significant in recent 
years, and pendulum migration by retired persons from 
Germany and Turkey. In both directions there has 
been a great increase in business and holiday trips, 
and temporary movements of students, researchers 
and other highly qualified persons. This enormous 
intensification and diversification of the exchange is 
only one characteristic of the transnationalisation 
that has taken place in relations between Germany 
and Turkey in the past. Transnationality is expressed 
in bicultural orientation and in the double identities 
and double loyalties of people from Turkey in Ger-
many, but also in their activities, which relate to both 
countries. This trend has been reinforced by current 
process of globalisation in general, by new means of 
communication and transport, and by the extension 
of citizens’, social and political rights to migrants. 
In Germany a transnational diaspora of persons 
originating from Turkey has emerged in which social, 
cultural and political elements from Turkey continue 
to operate and mix with local elements, influencing 
both societies and political systems. In this process 
Turkish media with their editorial teams for Germany 
and Europe have an important role in transmission. 
They form an “intermediate world”, as it were, of 
German-Turkish relations. In view of the fact that the 
interests of people from Turkey are given little cover-
15  Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert, Länderprofil Türkei, Focus 
Migration 5/2009 (Hamburg and Bonn, April 2009), http:// 
focus-migration.hwwi.de/Tuerkei-Update-04-2.6026.0.html 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
16  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish 
Citizens Living Abroad (online), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-
expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa (accessed 13 January 2014). 
age and are little served in German media, this is par-
ticularly important. A significant intermediary func-
tion in the communication process between native 
residents and people originating in Turkey is also 
fulfilled by the migrants’ own organisations, which 
usually have a transnational orientation. People from 
Turkey with their economic, socio-political and cul-
tural activities not only have a lasting influence on 
society and politics in Germany but also on parts of 
German-Turkish and EU-Turkish relations. But what 
characteristics of identity can be ascertained that 
make it justifiable to speak of a “diaspora of people 
from Turkey”? 
Going beyond the classic uses of the term, today 
“diaspora” characterises ethno-cultural or religious 
groups that live outside their countries of origin for 
various reasons. Diasporas are “part of and stake-
holders in those transnational networks in which the 
life of society is simultaneously contextualised ‘here’ 
and ‘there’”, in which “dual loyalties and multiple 
identities are formed and asserted against the identity 
demands of the nation state”.17 Four distinguishing 
features constitute a diaspora: 
a) Dispersion: spread beyond the territory of origin; 
b) Retrospection: ties to the country of origin and iden-
tification with it; 
c) Community spirit: collective experience of exclusion 
and discrimination in the host country; 
d) Exterritoriality: a collective identity that is no longer 
necessarily tied to belonging to a specific territorial 
area.18 
People originating from Turkey in Germany have 
an identity that can be distinguished from that of the 
majority of society. They maintain close and perma-
nent relationships to Turkey and possess a high degree 
of organisation. Although they have not been entirely 
included from the formation of public opinion in Ger-
many, they are nevertheless now perceived as a target 
group by political parties more strongly than in the 
past. The spectrum of employment in this transnation-
al diaspora in Germany is far from homogeneous. It 
ranges from successful businesspeople, academics, 
artists, skilled workers, unskilled workers to retired 
persons and the unemployed. 
17  Helmuth Berking, “‘Homes away from Home’: Zum 
Spannungsverhältnis von Diaspora und Nationalstaat”, 
Berliner Journal für Soziologie 10, no. 1 (2000): 49–60 (53). 
18  Ibid. 
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Power shifts in society 
Power shifts in society 
For more than a decade, Turkey has been undergoing 
a process of transformation that is already accompa-
nied by clear shifts in political, economic and social 
power. In 2001 the three-party coalition consisting 
of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Party of the 
Nationalist Movement (MHP) and the Motherland 
Party (AnaP) under Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit ini-
tiated a reform programme that was continued by 
the AKP government. Far-reaching legislative changes 
brought the political institutions and the economic 
and legal system of Turkey closer to EU standards and 
contributed to a further democratisation and plurali-
sation of the country. This earned respect for Turkey 
and increased the confidence placed in it by third 
parties, which in turn meant that Turkey was able to 
extend the scope of its economic and foreign policy. 
In the last decade, direct investment from abroad has 
increased enormously, the overall size of the economy 
has increased19 and Turkey has become a destination 
for migrants. 
The AKP government was able to take credit for 
these developments and thus gain legitimacy for its 
fight against the secular national power bloc, which 
includes the army and members of the civil service 
and judiciary. The party won three parliamentary 
elections in succession (2002, 2007, 2011) and three 
nationwide rounds of local elections (2004, 2009, 
2014), increasing its share of the vote every time 
except in 2009. In 2007 the AKP was already strong 
enough to stand up to the army in an open confronta-
tion when the armed forces tried to put the govern-
ment under pressure with an internet memorandum 
in order to force a compromise in the election of the 
state president. The leadership of the AKP decided 
to bring forward the parliamentary elections, from 
which the party emerged as the clear winner in July 
2007, and had their candidate, Abdullah Gül, elected 
to the office of state president in the new parliament. 
In 2008 the AKP fought off a proposed prohibition, 
and in 2010 won a referendum to change the con-
stitution and in 2011 a further power struggle with 
the army leadership. Through the referendum in 2010 
the AKP government succeeded in pushing through a 
change in the law for restructuring the High Council 
of judges and state prosecutors and in breaking resist-
ance in the judiciary. Step by step the AKP consoli-
19  For relevant economic data cf. Das Statistik-Portal (online), 
http://de.statista.com. 
dated its hegemony in opposition to the old Kemalist 
and secular elites and institutions. 
The rise of a new power elite and a new conserva-
tive class of business people was the prerequisite for 
the U-turn in foreign policy at the end of the first 
decade of the 21st century.20 The changeover of power 
was accompanied and legitimised by the idea of 
“multiple modernity” and a discourse that indicated 
geopolitical ambitions and was labelled “neo-Ottoman”, 
especially abroad. The neo-Ottoman attitude is exem-
plified in a speech that Erdoğan made following the 
parliamentary elections on 12 June 2011. He portrayed 
the election victory of the AKP as a “victory for Mus-
lims” and greeted countries and cities that once 
belonged to the Ottoman Empire: “Today both Istan-
bul and Sarajevo have won, both Ankara and Damas-
cus, both Diyarbakır and Ramallah, as well as Nablus, 
Jenin, the West Bank of Jordan, Jerusalem and the 
Gaza Strip”.21 The speech of the Turkish foreign minis-
ter Ahmet Davutoğlu at the conference on “Ottoman 
Legacy and Muslim Communities in the Balkans Today” 
in Sarajevo tended in the same direction: “What is 
Turkey?”, Davutoğlu asked there, and provided the 
answer himself: “Turkey is the Lesser Balkans, the 
Lesser Middle East, the Lesser Caucasus. More Bosnians 
live among us than in Bosnia, more Albanians than in 
Albania, more Chechens than in Chechnya, more Ab-
khazians than in Abkhazia. How is that possible? The 
Ottoman legacy makes it possible.”22 Neo-Ottomanism 
can be explained in three ways: it provides an alter-
native frame of reference vis-à-vis Kemalism; it has a 
motivating effect domestically; and it gives ideological 
support to the opening of the economy internationally 
and the expansionary Turkish export policy.23 
The emphasis on multiple – geographical, historical 
and religious – identities of Turkey by the state elites 
was accompanied by the propagation of a Muslim 
nationalism that is not based primarily on race and 
language but is oriented towards a historic Turkish 
and Ottoman identity. This “Muslim nationalism” 
20  For a detailed discussion of internal political dynamics 
of the reorientation in foreign policy and the rise of new 
players, see Günter Seufert, Außenpolitik und Selbstverständnis. 
Die gesellschaftliche Fundierung von Strategiewechseln in der Türkei, 
SWP-Studie 11/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, June 2012). 
21  See Hürriyet, 13 June 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ 
gundem/18015912.asp (accessed 23 March 2014). 
22  Quoted according to Baskın Oran, Turkish Foreign Policy 
(Turkish), vol. 3: 2001–2012 (Istanbul, 2013), 199. 
23  Ibid., 198. 
SWP Berlin 
The New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
October 2014 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
Driving Forces and Central Institutions of the New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
makes it possible on the one hand to recognise other 
identities such as that of the Kurds which were ignored 
and repressed in Turkish public life for a long time. 
On the other hand it reinforces the “feeling of Muslim 
national identity”, which has a stronger appeal than 
Kemalism in the broad population, being a religiously 
motivated, exclusive internal group solidarity that 
demands an affirmative position in relation to state 
authority.24 Emphasising “common historical and 
cultural heritage” also makes it easier for Ankara to 
turn to Muslim neighbours and “related communi-
ties”. The new Turkish diaspora policy with its focus 
on people originating from Turkey in Europe there-
fore goes hand in hand with a foreign policy that aims 
to intensify relations to Muslims in the Balkans and 
the Caucasus and to Turkic peoples. 
The new orientation in 
Turkish foreign policy 
Turkey’s “new” diaspora policy is partly a consequence 
of the re-orientation in foreign policy described above, 
which is by no means merely a shift in priorities with-
in the “continuity of Turkish foreign policy activism 
following the end of the east-west conflicts”.25 Even 
though increased foreign policy activity in the region 
and the controversial concept of “strategic depth” are 
in line with the tradition of Turkish foreign policy as 
the implementation of national interests, the project 
of foreign minister Davutoğlu represents a “break 
with Kemalist tradition” in four ways.26 Turkish for-
eign policy after the Second World War was character-
ised by four constant elements that were revised 
under the AKP government: 
1. Ties to the western alliance and political system in 
foreign and security policy (western ties); 
2. Distance to neighbouring states due to tensions 
in relationships arising from the Ottoman past 
(regional foreign-policy abstinence); 
24  Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
25  Gülistan Gürbey, “Wandel in der türkischen Außenpolitik 
unter der AKP-Regierung?”, Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 50, no. 2 
(2010): 16–27 (26). 
26  Heinz Kramer, “Zwischen Tradition und Neuorientierung: 
Die Außenpolitik”, in idem, Türkei, Informationen zur poli-
tischen Bildung 313 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bil-
dung, 2011), 55. 
3. Absolute priority for securing the territorial and 
societal foundations of the Turkish Republic (orien-
tation to security paradigm); 
4. Setting down of foreign policy guidelines by the 
Turkish army with the inclusion of high-ranking 
civil servants (military hegemony).27 
The factors that were responsible for the change 
in Turkish foreign policy, which began after the end 
of the Cold War, were shifts in global power, the dis-
integration of the Communist bloc and processes of 
globalisation that also affected Turkey. In this con-
nection, four developments were of especial impor-
tance: 
1)  From a state on the wings to a front-line state: 
With its membership of the western military alliance, 
Turkey recognised the “protective and leading role of 
the USA as the undisputed primary western power”. 
After the end of the east-west conflict, which Davutoğlu 
describes as a geopolitical “earthquake”28, the signifi-
cance of Turkey as the “south-eastern pillar of NATO” 
disappeared and its geostrategic importance sank to 
its nadir; Ankara reacted to this by turning increas-
ingly to the newly founded Turkic states of Central 
Asia. 
2)  Foreign policy activism: In the era of Turgut Özal 
(1983–93) the Turkish government departed from its 
traditionally passive and one-dimensional foreign poli-
cy in favour of an active and multidimensional foreign 
policy, with which several aims in various fields were 
connected: by means of multilateral economic cooper-
ation in its region, it aimed to deepen economic rela-
tions to its neighbours; in regional and international 
politics Turkey was to establish its position as a lead-
ing power; and a belt of security, stability and affluence 
was to be created around the country, without aban-
doning “the priority of strategic partnership with the 
West”.29 
3)  Extending the radius of foreign policy: Turkey 
reacted to the break-up of the Communist bloc and 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by extending the 
radius of its foreign policy. The aim of this was to put 
relations with states in the Caucasus, the Near East, 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Balkans on a new 
27  Gürbey, “Wandel in der türkischen Außenpolitik” 
(see note 25): 18. 
28  Ahmet Davutoğlu, “The Three Major Earthquakes in the 
International System and Turkey”, The International Spectator: 
Italian Journal of International Affairs 48, no. 2 (June 2013): 1–11 
(2). 
29  Gürbey, “Wandel in der türkischen Außenpolitik” 
(see note 25): 19. 
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What is “new” about the new diaspora policy? 
basis. While Ahmet Davutoğlu was in office, North 
Africa too was included in this area of primary 
activity. 
4)  Discovery of the role of bridge and model: With 
the increased strength of political Islam and following 
the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, Turkey was 
increasingly hailed as a bridge between the Orient and 
the West, and between Islam and the West, and as a 
model for the compatibility of democracy and Islam.30 
After Ahmet Davutoğlu took office in May 2009, the 
parameters of Turkish foreign policy shifted consid-
erably once more. “Strategic depth” and “no problems 
with neighbouring states”31 are the key concepts in 
this multidimensional foreign policy, which not only 
goes hand in hand with a new feeling of national iden-
tity but is also guided by the maxims of economic 
rationality and is accompanied by an export-oriented 
economic policy (primacy of the economy)32. The concept 
of “strategic depth” is based on four principles, among 
other things: 
1. Emphasising the multiple identities of Turkey, which 
result from various religions, historical experiences 
and geographical peculiarities.33 
2. Proactivity and multidimensionality as essential guide-
lines of foreign policy towards the states of the Near 
and Middle East, Africa and Asia. In other words, 
relations to these regions are to be maintained and 
deepened on manifold levels, from business to secu-
rity and geostrategic questions. 
3. Presence in solving conflicts, which is to be expressed in 
the role of Turkey as a mediator between parties to 
conflicts. This aim is underpinned by a liberal visa 
policy and immigration regulations from citizens of 
states in the region. 
30  In the words of the former Turkish foreign minister and 
prime minister Mesut Yılmaz in an interview with Eurasisches 
Magazin on 6 March 2003: “We, the Turks, add a new element. 
We know Europe, as we have been part of its history and will 
be part of it again soon, though in a much more peaceful 
way. But we also know Asia and thus fulfil the function of a 
bridge that the EU ought not to do without. This is our Eura-
sian task”, Eurasisches Magazin (online), 25 June 2003, http:// 
www.eurasischesmagazin.de/artikel/Wir-Tuerken-erfuellen-
eine-Brueckenfunktion-das-ist-unsere-eurasische-Aufgabe/ 
60603 (accessed 16 January 2014). 
31  Ahmet Davutoğlu, Strategische Tiefe: Internationale Position 
der Türkei (Turkish), (Istanbul, 2005). 
32  Kemal Kirişci, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign 
Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives on 
Turkey, no. 40 (2009): 29–57. 
33  Heinz Kramer, “The Future of Turkish-Western Relations”, 
Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 53, no. 1 (2013): 57–72 (60). 
4. Regarding civil society and the business community 
as target groups of foreign policy. 
The new orientation of Turkish foreign policy is 
also reflected in the restructuring of the responsible 
offices and the introduction of new institutions. On 
13 July 2010 a new “organisation law” for the foreign 
ministry came into force. In 2012 the scope of activ-
ities of the Turkish Presidium for International Co-
operation and Coordination (TİKA), the Turkish state 
agency for development aid, was extended and its 
budget significantly increased. In the Office for Turks 
Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) the govern-
ment created a new state organ. It also established 
new institutions for public diplomacy. One core com-
ponent of the multidimensional foreign policy of 
Turkey is an active diaspora policy, which is connected 
to economic, political and cultural interests. 
What is “new” about the new 
diaspora policy? 
Turkey’s policy towards Turkish citizens in Europe can 
be described as a diaspora policy since the 1980s at 
the latest, as the permanence of the presence of people 
from Turkey in various European countries has been 
undisputed since then. But what is “new” about the 
current diaspora policy? Firstly the explicit designa-
tion of people abroad who originated in Turkey as a 
“diaspora”; secondly that a policy relating to them is 
embedded in a strategy of public diplomacy34 that is 
a core element of the present proactive foreign policy; 
and finally the connection of this policy with a new 
view of the nation, which is compatible with multiple 
Muslim identities. 
The current diaspora policy must also be seen in 
the context of a general transnationalisation of Turk-
ish foreign policy: although this continues to be the 
domain of the executive, in recent years it has been 
opened to members of civil society, think-tanks and 
business associations, and has a stronger obligation 
today to justify itself publicly. A consequence of trans-
nationalisation in turn is that communications 
34  The term “public diplomacy” refers to a method of pro-
moting national interests by directly convincing the foreign 
public and foreign opinion leaders. İbrahim Kalın, foreign-
policy adviser to the former Turkish prime minister Erdoğan, 
writes: “The new Turkish public diplomacy is building on 
Turkey’s expanding soft power in the Balkans, the Middle East 
and Caucasus”, see İbrahim Kalın, “Soft Power and Public 
Diplomacy in Turkey”, Perceptions 16, no. 3 (2011): 5–23 (5). 
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Driving Forces and Central Institutions of the New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
between Germany and Turkey, which was previously 
entirely at state level, is increasingly marked by infor-
mal, individual relationships beneath the level of state 
communication. The result of this is that the separa-
tion between domestic and foreign-policy issues is 
becoming blurred. Domestic issues such as the paths 
of integration of people from Turkey in Germany, dual 
nationality, the uniting of families or the placement 
of children of Turkish origin with foster parents are 
becoming a foreign-policy issue, and foreign-policy 
topics such as EU membership for Turkey or criticism 
of the Turkish government are becoming matters of 
German domestic politics, partly because they are 
being raised by organisations of the Turkish diaspora. 
In consequence domestic policy is becoming foreign 
policy, and foreign policy is becoming domestic policy, 
an effect that is reinforced by Turkish diaspora poli-
cy, leading to additional conflicts in German-Turkish 
relations. 
The shrinking of distances that once kept worlds 
apart thanks to new transport and communication 
technologies and facilities such as cheap flights, flat-
rate telephone accounts and satellite TV, and the 
liberalisation of international flows of money and 
goods have made the instrument of diaspora policy an 
attractive option for Turkey: members of the diaspora 
constitute human, economic and social capital that 
can be used to intensify economic relations and trade 
with the host country and to open up new investment 
opportunities. The perspectives associated with this 
partly explain the eagerness with which Turkey sup-
ports its diaspora policy by means of public diplo-
macy.35 
The “new” element of current Turkish diaspora 
policy is also reflected in institutional developments 
and official rhetoric. Here the founding of YTB in 2010 
may be regarded as a break. At the fourth Ambassa-
dors’ Conference of the foreign ministry, the Turkish 
foreign minister Davutoğlu argued for a new defini-
tion of diaspora on 23 December 2011. Every individ-
ual who originated in Anatolia belongs to the Turkish 
diaspora, he stated, regardless of religion and ethnic-
35  Kemal Yurtnaç, chairman of the YTB, writes on this 
matter: “Today many countries work to strengthen their 
public diplomacy efforts, or ‘soft power’, and expand their 
sphere of influence through their diasporas. [T]he transfor-
mations in Turkish foreign policy in recent years facilitated 
its quest to have richer relations with the citizens and kin 
communities abroad” (Turkey’s New Horizon: Turks Abroad and 
Related Communities, SAM Papers 3/2012 [Ankara: SAM, Center 
for Strategic Research, October 2012], 3f.). 
ity. This also included Armenians and Greeks, whom 
the Turkish government would approach in order to 
“win their hearts”. “We will talk to every Armenian 
and member of the Orthodox church who has emi-
grated from Turkey. We will talk about our glorious 
shared past,” continued Davutoğlu.36 Despite pater-
nalistic undertones and the romanticisation of the 
Ottoman past, this could have been the beginning 
of opening the official view of the nation towards a 
multicultural Turkish identity. Contrary to this 
“inclusive” rhetoric, however, shortly afterwards, on 
26 February 2012 in Istanbul, it was tolerated that a 
demonstration of solidarity with Azerbaijanis mur-
dered by Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh, in which 
the then Turkish minister of the interior participated, 
took on a character hostile to Armenia and that racist 
slogans were chanted. So far Turkey has not succeeded 
in matching words supporting integration with cor-
responding actions. 
Economic, political and cultural interests 
Economic interests 
Not only Turkish foreign policy has been sensitive to 
business interests since the change of course; this also 
applies to the new diaspora policy. In the last 10 years, 
Turkish direct investment abroad has increased con-
tinuously. In 2010 it amounted to 1,784 million, in 
2011 to 2,657 million and in 2012 to 4,043 million US 
dollars. Its main destination was Europe (81 per cent, 
or 3273 million US dollars), followed by the Near and 
Middle East (10 per cent, or 421 million US dollars) 
and Asia (3 per cent, or 132 million US dollars). Among 
individual states, in 2012 Germany was in eighth 
place among the destinations of Turkish direct invest-
ment abroad with 5.7 million US dollars.37 The impor-
tance of the Turkish diaspora for Ankara’s foreign eco-
nomic policy is due not only to the close trade links 
36  Oran, Turkish Foreign Policy (see note 22), 189. Similar com-
ments were made by Ömer Çelik, former Turkish minister 
for culture and tourism: “Armenians from Anatolia are part 
of the Turkish diaspora”, quoted in: Milliyet, 26 April 2013, 
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/anadolu-dan-cikanlar-turkiye-
diasporasidir/siyaset/siyasetdetay/26.04.2013/1698688/ 
default.htm (accessed 21 March 2014). 
37  DEİK, Dünya’da ve Türkiye’de Yurtdışı Doğrudan Yatırımlar 
[Foreign Direct Investments in the World and in Turkey], 
(Istanbul, August 2013), 43f., http://www.ydy.gov.tr/upload/ 
Yatirim2013.pdf (accessed 14 June 2014). 
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Economic, political and cultural interests 
between Germany and Turkey – Germany was Turkey’s 
biggest trade partner in 2012 – but also to the large 
number of entrepreneurs in Germany who originated 
in Turkey: according to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
half of the approximately 140,000 businesses in Europe 
run by such people are in Germany (70,000). In the 
whole of Europe they employ 640,000, in Germany 
330,000 persons. They have an annual turnover of 
more than 50 billion euros in Europe, and 32.7 billion 
euros in Germany.38 
In view of this it is understandable that the estab-
lished organisation of Turkish entrepreneurs, the 
Association of Turkish Chambers of Commerce and 
Exchanges (TOBB), is a pioneer of the idea of an active 
diaspora policy. The TOBB, which is regarded as loyal 
to the state, and its chairman M. Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu 
work to expand diaspora networks and played a 
leading role at the major conference of non-govern-
mental organisations that was held on 7 and 8 June 
2012 in Ankara. At irregular intervals the YTB holds 
meetings of diaspora organisations, to which repre-
sentatives of associations of people abroad who 
originated in Turkey are invited. The founding of the 
Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (DEIK)39 
1986 under the auspices of the TOBB was already an 
indication of a new orientation and enhanced con-
sideration of international markets by the association 
of chambers of commerce. The explicit task of the 
DEIK is to strengthen cooperation worldwide with the 
Turkish diaspora with the aim of opening up new 
opportunities for exports and investments.40 In order 
to exploit the potential of people from Turkey abroad 
for the benefit of the Turkish economy, a coherent and 
active diaspora policy is stated to be necessary. 
With this approach and this rhetoric, the TOBB is 
in harmony with the official discourse of the Turkish 
political leadership in respect of the topic of the dias-
pora. The arguments for the use of the term “dias-
pora”, which has been adopted in official terminology, 
38  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish 
Citizens Living Abroad (see note 16). 
39  DEİK is an association representing business interests, 
founded in 1986 on the instructions of the then prime 
minister, Turgut Özal, and directed by the TOBB. Its declared 
aims include supporting Turkish companies in the public 
and private sector in opening up new markets; see http:// 
www.deik.org.tr/287/DeikHakkinda.html (accessed 24 March 
2014). DEİK is associated with the Turkish development 
ministry of maintains offices in Washington, Moscow and 
Brussels. 
40  Internet site of DEİK, http://en.deik.org.tr/287/ 
DeikHakkinda.html (accessed 16 January 2014). 
are said to be first of all the advanced state of inte-
gration and participation of people from Turkey in 
society, politics and business in their European host 
countries. A further reason why the term “diaspora” is 
used, it is stated, is the global spread of people origi-
nating in Turkey, which continues regardless of their 
cultural ties and manifold relationships to Turkey. At 
the same time, it is stated, among the migrants, espe-
cially in Western Europe, a marked differentiation in 
social, political and employment matters has taken 
place, yet the Turkish diaspora lacks effective institu-
tions despite the diversity of its organisational struc-
ture.41 
In a policy paper published in 2011 the TOBB there-
fore suggested a number of measures and strategies 
for a more effective diaspora policy. These can be cat-
egorised in three groups: 
1. Increasing the economic potential of the Turkish diaspora 
by means of targeted business promotion: For this pur-
pose, with professional support, entrepreneurs’ net-
works are to be formed, diaspora organisations 
made more effective and a global diaspora network 
established. 
2. Strengthening the integration of members of the diaspora 
in the host countries: For this purpose training and 
internship positions for people originating from 
Turkey are to be offered in Turkey, programmes to 
promote integration initiated, and cultural insti-
tutes established. It is also intended to create plat-
forms for legal assistance and to found a diaspora 
support fund. 
3. Promoting positive mutual interaction between the Turkish 
diaspora and Turkey: In this connection extended citi-
zenship, programmes or travel to Turkey, and train-
ing, education and internship projects in Turkey for 
members of the diaspora are under discussion.42 
Political interests 
The diaspora in Germany is important to the Turkish 
government for political reasons, too, because of its 
degree of organisation and the social influence that it 
has now acquired. In addition to numerous represen-
tatives of people from Turkey in local councils and in 
the parliaments of federal states, at present 11 mem-
41  DEİK, International Diaspora Strategies and Proposals for the 
Turkish Diaspora (Turkish), (Istanbul, 2011), 3, http://www. 
deik.org.tr/2886/Dünyada_Diaspora_Stratejileri_ve_Türk_ 
Diasporası_için_Öneriler.htm (accessed 16 January 2014). 
42  Ibid., 29–31. 
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bers of the 18th Bundestag and one minister of state 
(Aydan Özoğuz, commissioner for migration, refugees 
and integration) come from a Turkish migrant back-
ground. The Turkish government is aware of the im-
portance of this political representation and regards it 
as a political lever for exerting favourable influence 
on the relationship of Turkey to the EU. 
One of the main interests of Turkish diaspora policy 
is to deepen and improve relations with the EU. The 
need for an active diaspora policy is justified today 
with reference, among other factors, to the member-
ship negotiations with the EU. Turkish decision-makers 
assume that the degree of integration of people from 
Turkey in various European countries will be a signifi-
cant factor in discussions about EU membership for 
Turkey. In Germany the view is widely held that the 
admission of Turkey to the EU would set off a flow of 
migration that could make the integration of people 
from Turkey more difficult. 
From the official point of view in Ankara, the fact of 
the diaspora in Europe of people originating in Turkey 
is a “strong legitimation” for Turkey’s membership of 
the EU and for its belonging to Europe.43 Statements 
by the AKP leadership also suggest that it regards the 
numerous and relatively well organised migrant com-
munity in Germany partly as a lobby. 
For the Turkish government, the diaspora in Ger-
many is a legitimate political player whose loyalty and 
strength it can count on. Accordingly it attaches great 
importance to the economic success, the upward 
social mobility and the “multicultural contribution” 
of people from Turkey in Europe. It supports full inte-
gration of these people in their European countries 
of residence partly because it sees the diaspora as a 
“representative of Turkey” and its success as proof of 
the compatibility of Turkey with the EU.44 Conse-
quently one aim of the new Turkish diaspora policy is 
to support the political activities of people of Turkish 
origin and their demand for extension of their eco-
nomic, social, cultural and legal rights in the European 
host countries. 
43  Bilgili and Siegel, Understanding the Changing Role of the 
Turkish Diaspora (see note 7), 2. 
44  Ibid., 1; Ünver, “Changing Diaspora Politics” (see note 6): 
188. Gürsel Dönmez, vice-chairman of the YTB, explained 
in an interview: “We wish Turkey to have a good image in 
Europe. We cannot achieve this simply by wishing. You al-
ready know that we bear a great responsibility here. Together 
we have seen that we can enrich and complement each other 
both on the institutional and on the subjective level”, quoted 
in Artı 90 (October–December 2013): 94. 
The AKP government also has a political interest in 
establishing symmetry by activating the Turkish dias-
pora in relation to those countries. German-Turkish 
relations, for example, were asymmetrical in the past 
due to the political and economic weakness of Turkey. 
The asymmetry was evident in the German-Turkish 
agreement for recruiting workers: Germany was able 
to negotiate conditions in its favour. In private con-
versations, Turkish diplomats frequently express their 
dissatisfaction with this inequality in German-Turkish 
relations. One undoubted reason for this – in addition 
to the inequality in power – was the poorer status of 
Turkey arising from infringements of human rights. 
Cultural interests 
Cultural interests too are ultimately associated with 
the new Turkish diaspora policy. They are expressed 
most clearly in the shape of the Yunus Emre Cultural 
Centres (YEKM).45 The law establishing the Yunus Emre 
Foundation (YEV) names a number of intentions of 
cultural policy. They include presenting Turkish cul-
tural heritage, promoting cultural exchange, making 
information about Turkey available and providing 
educational services on Turkish language and culture 
and on the country’s arts.46 These intentions can hard-
ly be separated from political aims, as they are also 
part of public diplomacy and are intended to improve 
the image of Turkey abroad.47 
In relation to the task of disseminating the Turkish 
language and culture, recourse is had, depending 
on the situation, to a neo-Ottoman or modernist dis-
course. In the EU the emphasis is on mobilising people 
from Turkey in order to gain influence on politics in 
those countries, while in the Balkans, Caucasus, Near 
East and Central Asia the primary aim is to position 
Turkey as an important regional player by means of 
language and cultural offerings. 
In his speech for the opening of the YEKM in the Al-
banian capital Tirana on 11 December 2009, the Turk-
ish state president Abdullah Gül described the cul-
45  The Yunus Emre Cultural Centres are part of the Yunus 
Emre Foundation, which was established in 2007. Its legal 
basis is law no. 5653, passed on 5 May 2007. Yunus Emre was 
an Anatolian poet and Sufi mystic who lived in the 14th cen-
tury. Today he is regarded as a pioneer of Turkish culture in 
Anatolia and has the approval of both the Sunni and the 
Alevi population. 
46  Law no. 5653 of 5 May 2007, article 1. 
47  Ünver, “Changing Diaspora Politics” (see note 6): 188. 
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tural institutes as “the invisible power” of Turkey. 
Their cultural heritage, he said, was “the greatest 
power of Turkey” and had therefore to be cared for: 
“Not all countries have the power. We should value 
this cultural heritage.” Foreign minister Davutoğlu 
in turn put the spotlight on two tasks in his opening 
speech on 16 October 2009 in Sarajevo: “Firstly to 
make possible an encounter of our national culture 
with universal culture and [secondly] to reinforce the 
effect of our national culture within the ‘universal 
culture’.”48 
Central institutions of the 
new Turkish diaspora policy 
The legal basis of diaspora policy is article 62 of the 
Turkish constitution, which stipulates that the state 
should “take all necessary measures to ensure family 
unity, the education of children, and the social secu-
rity of Turkish citizens working abroad, to secure their 
ties to their homeland and to help them to return”.49 
A further legal foundation is the law about the orga-
nisation and tasks of the YTB.50 The following insti-
tutions are relevant to Turkish diaspora policy. 
The Turkish Islamic Union (DİTİB) 
The Turkish Islamic Union of the State Office of Reli-
gious Affairs (DİTİB) was founded as a religious asso-
ciation in 1982 in Berlin. In 1985 DİTİB in Cologne 
was extended to become the umbrella organisation for 
mosque associations in Germany. The foundation of 
DİTİB by the Turkish Office of Religious Affairs was 
by no means only a reaction to the religious needs of 
people originating from Turkey, but at the same time 
a reaction to the “emergence of Islamic communities 
in the European diaspora that are independent and 
critical of the regime”, such as the Islamic Cultural 
Centre of the Süleymancıs (IKMB), the Islamic Com-
munity Millî Görüş (IGMG) and the supporters of 
48  Yunus Emre Bülteni 1, no. 1 (September 2009): 6, http:// 
yee.org.tr/media/_bulten/pdf/eylul_2009.pdf (accessed 
22 January 2014). 
49  See Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Turkish), http:// 
www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf (accessed 
27 February 2014). 
50  Law no. 5978, § 8, Resmî Gazete (official publication), 
6 April 2010, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/ 
2010/04/20100406-1.htm (accessed 27 February 2014). 
Kaplan.51 The Turkish state saw the activities of these 
groups as a threat to the collective identity of mem-
bers of the diaspora and to the official view of the 
secular state. The aim of DİTİB in its own words is to 
give Muslims “a place to exercise their religious beliefs 
and to make a contribution to integration”. In addi-
tion to carrying out religious services, the support 
work of DİTİB is organised in four areas: a department 
for education and culture; a youth department; a 
women’s department; and a department concerned 
with intercultural and interreligious dialogue. 
DİTİB is subject to the management and control of 
the Turkish state Presidium for Religious Affairs (DİB) 
and thus represents a view of Islam that is compatible 
with the official policy of a secular state. The associa-
tion also runs a fund for financing and organising the 
repatriation and burial of deceased Turkish Muslims. 
The Office for Turks Abroad (YTB) 
On 6 April 2010 a law came into force that founded 
the Office for Turks Abroad and Related Communities 
(YTB). The YTB has the status of a state secretariat 
and is supervised by the prime minister’s office of the 
Republic of Turkey. By creating this new office, the 
government in Ankara gave an institutional basis to 
relations to Turkish citizens abroad and to related 
communities.52 The YTB has four areas of activity: 
1. Turkish citizens abroad: The task of the YTB is to ex-
plore opportunities for cooperation with Turkish 
citizens abroad, to develop relevant strategies and 
coordinate activities relating to people from Turkey 
and their associations. 
2. “Related communities”: This term refers to, for example, 
Muslims in the Balkans who have historically shared 
the geography and “culture” of the Turks. These 
communities too are in the focus of the YTB. 
3. International students: A further role of the YTB is 
to support students of Turkish origin and Muslim 
students from the Turkic republics and the Balkan 
states for studies in Turkey. The YTB is tasked with 
offering different courses of education to potential 
students and keeping contact to them after their 
studies. 
51  Werner Schiffauer, “Die Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş”, 
in Migrationsreport 2004, ed. Klaus Bade et al. (Frankfurt, 2004), 
77. 
52  See the website of the Office for Turks Abroad and Related 
Communities, http://www.ytb.gov.tr/index.php/kurumsal/ 
hakkimizda.html (accessed 20 January 2014). 
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4. Non-governmental organisations: To accompany the 
previous three aims, the YTB is to assist organisa-
tions of people from Turkey abroad in their efforts 
to gain political participation in their countries of 
residence and to help them to intensify their rela-
tions to Turkey.53 
The YTB publishes a quarterly magazine, Artı 90 
(Plus 90), whose motto is: “We are everywhere where 
we have a citizen, a comrade, a relative.” The leading 
article of one issue of this magazine begins with the 
sentence: “The Republic of Turkey, whose voice carries 
weight in the region and the world, stands behind 
you.”54 In this article Kemal Yurtnaç, chairman of the 
YTB, describes Islamophobia that “was made to circu-
late” after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 as 
the biggest problem of Turks abroad. A further evil, 
he writes, is the structural discrimination of pupils 
originating from Turkey, which is expressed in “pater-
nalistic assignment of roles” and “prejudiced guidance 
in the choice of schools and professions” by teachers. 
In contrast to the German authorities, he writes, which 
do not motivate Turkish migrants towards upward 
social mobility, the YTB encourages young people 
originating from Turkey to educate themselves. A 
further criticism expressed by Yurtnaç relates to the 
social services for young people, which “deliberately” 
place Turkish foster children with Christian families, 
in some cases even with families that have drug-addic-
tion problems or with “lesbian partners”. This, he 
alleges, is part of a conscious policy of assimilation. 
By its own account this office offers help to people 
from Turkey if they feel discriminated against, sub-
jected to great pressure to assimilate or exposed to 
hostility to foreigners.55 According to the head of the 
YTB, representatives of associations of people of 
Turkish origin are invited to meetings several times 
each year. The decisive criterion for invitation is degree 
to which the organisations are rooted in the migrant 
community; ethnicity and religion are said not to be 
the criteria. The guiding principle is: the more diversity, 
the better. An advisory committee, to which people 
with origins in Turkey in countries of migration from 
various professions and various associations belong, 
takes care of communication with Europe.56 Murat 
53  Artı 90, no. 5 (January 2013): 12. 
54  Ibid., 6f. 
55  Ibid., 12f., and 15. 
56  Engin Akçay and Farkhad Alimukhamedov, “Revaluating 
Contemporary ‘Diaspora Policy of Turkey’”, The Journal of 
Faculty of Economics (Süleyman Demirel University) 18, no. 1 
(2013): 103–15 (107). 
Gürbüz from the YTB has emphasised in an inter-
view57 that the term “Turks abroad” is based on the 
principle of state citizenship while the term “related 
communities” suggests an ethno-cultural view of the 
nation. 
The Yunus Emre Cultural Centres (YEKM) 
As has been seen, the aim of Turkish public diplomacy 
and foreign cultural policy is to strengthen “soft 
power”.58 The pillars of this strategy are the Yunus 
Emre Foundation (YEV) and the Yunus Emre Cultural 
Centres (YEKMs). The choice of cities that are the loca-
tions of the first YEKM is in harmony with the dias-
pora policy concept of historical and cultural heritage, 
which has clear neo-Ottoman undertones. In the opin-
ion of the sociologist and migration expert Ayhan 
Kaya, the task of the cultural institutes, in these loca-
tions especially, will be to popularise neo-Ottoman dis-
course with reference to common history.59 The speech 
of foreign minister Davutoğlu at the inauguration of 
the YEKM branch in Sarajevo is evidence of this: “This 
is the first cultural centre that we have opened. It is no 
coincidence that the first cultural centre is opened in 
Sarajevo. This is a conscious decision that we have 
made on the basis of careful consideration. If one were 
to ask which is the place that reflects Turkish culture 
in the best way, this would be Sarajevo. Just as Istan-
bul is a fundamental city of Turkish culture, Sarajevo 
is the city of our common culture. Just as Sarajevo is a 
city of the Bosniaks, Istanbul is the common city of the 
Bosniaks. Başçarşı and Kapalı Çarşı,60 the Gazi Hüsrev 
57  The interview was conducted in November 2013 in 
Ankara. 
58  In contrast to “hard power”, i.e. to traditional forms of 
military or economic power that can be used to exert pres-
sure on others, “soft power” describes the ability to win over 
others or to induce them to take a decision in one’s own 
interest without applying forcible measures. According to the 
American political scientist Joseph S. Nye, “soft power” con-
sists of the persuasive force and attractiveness of the players, 
which lends them credibility; see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: 
The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, 2004). 
59  Ayhan Kaya and Ayşe Tecmen, The Role of Common Cultural 
Heritage in External Promotion of Modern Turkey: Yunus Emre Cul-
tural Centres, Working Paper 4, EU/4/2011 (Istanbul: Istanbul 
Bilgi University, European Institute, 2011), 13, http://eu.bilgi. 
edu.tr/media/uploads/2014/05/22/working-paper4_ 2.pdf 
(accessed 22 January 2014). 
60  Başçarşı (Serbo-Croat: Baščaršija) is the old quarter and 
bazaar of Sarajevo, which was built in the 16th century by 
the Ottomans. Kapalı Çarşı, the “great covered bazaar”, was 
SWP Berlin 
The New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
October 2014 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Central institutions of the new Turkish diaspora policy 
Bey Mosque and the Sultanahmet61 have the same 
spirit. Istanbul and Sarajevo are twin souls.”62 
Through research projects and a programme of 
cultural events and courses, the YEKMs are to make 
the Turkish language, culture, art and history known 
abroad and intensify intercultural relations to the 
associations in the target countries. For people origi-
nating from Turkeyk there are also special courses to 
learn or improve knowledge of the Turkish language 
and to learn about Turkish culture as a way of re-
inforcing the ties to Turkey of the persons thus 
addressed.63 
 
 
built by Sultan Mehmet II following the conquest of Istanbul. 
Later this complex was extended and used for a period as a 
bank or safe deposit for the private fortunes of rich merchants. 
61  The Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque was built in the 16th cen-
tury, commissioned by Gazi Husrev Beg, a nephew of Sultan 
Bayazit II, and is situated on the Başçarşı in Sarajevo. The 
Blue Mosque (Sultanahmet Camii) was commissioned by Sultan 
Ahmet I between 1609 and 1616 directly opposite Hagia 
Sophia and is now the main mosque in Istanbul and a lead-
ing example of Ottoman architecture. 
62  Opening speech by Ahmet Davutoğlu in Sarajevo, Yunus 
Emre Bülteni 1/2 (December 2009): 3, http://yee.org.tr/media/ 
_bulten/pdf/aralik_2009.pdf (accessed 22 January 2014). 
63  Yunus Emre Institut, http://yee.org.tr/turkiye/tr/kurumsal/ 
enstitu-baskanligi (accessed 11 October 2013). 
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Controversies 
 
The transnational umbrella organisations of people 
from Turkey in Germany fulfil an important role as 
bridges and mediators between Turkish migrant 
communities and the state institutions of the Federal 
Republic. They play a decisive role in the institution-
alised communication process between Germans 
and people from Turkey, and are involved to varying 
degrees – not fully, but partially – in the process of 
forming public opinion. They make political partici-
pation possible for Turkish migrants and lend them 
freedom of action that enables them to resist socio-
political pressure to assimilate and tendencies to ex-
clude or marginalise them. The transnationality of 
these umbrella organisations is manifested in their 
permanent contacts to political representatives in 
Germany and Turkey, and in decisions that they take 
on the basis of their knowledge of institutions and 
politics in both countries.64 Regardless of their role 
as a bridge and mediator, however, in Germany they 
are regarded by some decision-makers as an obstacle 
to the integration of people from Turkey and as an 
instrument of “extra-territorial expansion” by the 
Turkish state. Fears that associations of originating 
from Turkey could be dominated and made use of 
by the Turkish state are indeed strengthened by the 
conservative rhetoric of some Turkish politicians. 
Similar concerns are involved in the issue of dual 
nationality, which most umbrella organisations of 
people from Turkey demand. An article in the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung exemplifies the problems that 
might be associated with acceptance of dual national-
ity: “Conflicts could [arise ] […] in relations with Turkey, 
above all. Turkey would be able to conscript German 
Turks who live here to do military service. Is Germany 
then willing to buy out these holders of dual national-
ity? At extremely well attended events here in Germany, 
the Turkish prime minister Erdoğan has repeatedly 
made it clear that Turkey regards Turks living in Ger-
many as its fellow countrymen. […] Turkey thus has a 
64  Anna Amelina and Thomas Faist, “Turkish Migrant Asso-
ciations in Germany: Between Integration Pressure and Trans-
national Linkages”, Revue européenne des migrations internatio-
nales 24, no. 2 (2008): 91–120. 
foothold in Germany through nationality. […] Turkey 
is hardly mentioned as a problem.”65 
The umbrella associations are exposed to extremely 
diverse external expectations. On the one hand they 
have to respond to the needs of their members, who 
maintain relationships to their home country and 
wish to have their interests represented towards Ger-
man institutions. On the other hand they are exposed 
to political expectations on the part of the govern-
ment of the Federal Republic that demand coopera-
tion in fighting “Islamist” terrorism and radicalism, 
as well as effective work for integration.66 
The activities so far and positions currently adopted 
by the umbrella organisations of people originating 
from Turkey suggest that the ability of the Turkish 
government to control them is limited. Conversations67 
with representatives of the associations also lead to 
the assessment that the Turkish diaspora policy will 
scarcely have the opportunity to exercise a controlling 
influence on these organisations. 
 
 
65  Reinhard Müller, “Doppelpass macht doppelt Spaß?”, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 January 2014, 8. 
66  Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, “DITIB und IGMG als grenz-
überschreitende islamische Akteure – ein Vergleich”, lecture 
at the conference “Bosnisch, türkisch, deutsch oder? Wege zu 
einem europäischen Islam?”, Akademie der Diözese Rotten-
burg-Stuttgart, 15–16 November 2013 (Stuttgart-Hohenheim, 
2013). 
67  For this purpose interviews were conducted with chair-
men and representatives of the Alevi Community in Germany 
(AABF), the Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations 
(DİDF), the Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş (IGMG; Milli Görüş 
Islamic Community), the Türkische Gemeinde in Deutsch-
land (TGD; Turkish Community in Germany) and the Federa-
tion of Kurdish Associations in Germany (YEK-KOM, see sum-
mary, p. 21). These associations reflect approximately the 
political, religious and ethnic divisions within the diaspora 
communities of Turkish origin in Germany and have support 
among people of Turkish origin in Germany. 
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Summary 
Data on umbrella organisations and interviewees 
Associa-
tions 
Interviewee / Function Direction, aims, positions 
AABF Yılmaz Kahraman 
(board member 
responsible for 
education) 
 Religious community according to art. 7 para. 3 of GG, with cultural focus 
 Member of the umbrella organisation for the European Union of Alevi 
Communities (AABK) 
 Represents the Alevi in the Deutsche Islam-Konferenz (DIK) and at the 
integration summit 
 Revitalisation of Alevi religion, writing down and publishing “Alevi 
beliefs” 
 Interreligious dialogue and political consultancy 
 For integration, democratic values and secularism 
DİDF Özlem Alev Demirel 
(co-chairman) 
 Political organisation, left-wing socialist: orientation to “class struggle”, 
“international solidarity of workers” and anti-imperialism 
 Mobilisation of workers and young people against discrimination and 
social injustice 
 Approach: integration is a genuine “social issue” 
 Critical of religion 
IGMG Oğuz Üçüncü 
(secretary general at the 
time of the interview) 
 Religious community that organises “the religious life of Muslims 
comprehensively” and “all affairs of Muslims” 
 Improving the living conditions of Muslims and protection of their 
fundamental rights 
 Participation in social discourse that serves to solve economic, political 
and social problems of society  
TGD Kenan Kolat 
(chairman at the time 
of the interview) 
 Pluralist and “ideologically neutral” representation of interests with a 
secular emphasis 
 “Attending to the concerns and interests of Turks in Germany in public 
and vis-à-vis state institutions” 
 Equal treatment for migrants in Germany 
 Fighting hostility to foreigners and discrimination 
 Demanding the recognition of minorities as part of society with equal 
rights 
 Integration while “preserving cultural identity” 
 Appeal to migrants to identify “with Germany as a new home” 
YEK-KOM Yüksel Koç 
(co-chairman) 
 Integration of Kurds “into German society while preserving their own 
identity”, 
 Promoting cultural identity, religious and philosophical “values of the 
Kurdish people” 
 Realising the principles of peace and friendship among peoples, establish-
ing “peace in Kurdistan” 
 Commitment “to the unity of Kurdish society” and establishment of 
contacts to “democratic institutions in Turkey” 
 
AABF = Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu  
(Alevi Community in Germany); 
DİDF = Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu  
(Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations); 
IGMG = İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş (Islamische Gemeinde Millî 
Görüş/Millî Görüş Islamic Community); 
TGD = Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland  
(Turkish Community in Germany); 
YEK-KOM = Yekitîya Komalên Kurd Li Elmanya/ 
Almanya Kürt Dernekleri Federasyonu  
(Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany) 
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Convergence and common ground 
Despite this conclusion there is common ground 
between the contents and aims of Turkish diaspora 
policy and those of the largest umbrella organisa-
tions.68 This convergence primarily relates to three 
points: 
1.  On the question of maintaining and intensifying 
social, economic and political ties between the Turk-
ish migrant community and Turkey: most people 
whose origins are in Turkey maintain close and ex-
tremely lively connections to their country of origin 
and do not wish to be without these contacts. This 
transnational orientation and these connections are 
not called into question by the leaders of the umbrella 
organisations who were interviewed on this question, 
but rather explicitly welcomed in many cases. The 
organisations of people from Turkey employ trans-
nationality as a strategy to enhance their institutional 
and political efficiency and their legitimacy, as cross-
border structures do indeed expand their access to 
resources, for example by diversifying sources of in-
come and supporters. 
2.  On the question of preserving cultural identity: 
the organisations that were questioned are in favour 
of the integration of people from Turkey into the 
society of the Federal Republic, but at the same time 
support the cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora 
community. Almost all organisations see part of their 
task as strengthening contacts to the country of origin, 
maintaining its culture and language and to an extent 
also conserving the values that apply in their country 
of origin. These aims are in contradiction to the expec-
tations for integration of the German government, 
which are directed towards de-transnationalisation, 
i.e. to dissociation from the country of origin. 
3.  On the question of Turkish membership of the 
EU: apart from the Federation of Democratic Workers’ 
Associations (DİDF), all umbrella organisations – al-
though their motivations and considerations are 
highly diverse – support membership of the EU. In this 
point there is almost total convergence between the 
expectations of Turkey and those of almost all organi-
sations of people from Turkey in Germany. 
The Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland (Turkish 
Community in Germany, TGD), for example, which 
has a secular orientation and the majority of whose 
68  The following observations on the positions of the um-
brella organisations, if not shown otherwise, are taken from 
interviews conducted with their chairmen or representatives. 
members approve of the CHP and are critical of the 
AKP, shares at least three aims with the Turkish gov-
ernment: opening further stages in negotiations to 
join the EU; abolishing the obligation to opt for one 
nationality and acceptance of dual nationality by the 
federal government; and rejection of assimilation as 
the aim of integration.69 Kenan Kolat, chairman of the 
TGD when the interview was conducted, expresses 
the transnational position of his organisation in the 
following words: “Our hardware is Turkish, our soft-
ware German. We are bicultural people and want 
German Turks to feel secure in both cultures and to 
speak both languages and others well. We are Euro-
peans with a special affinity to Turkey, but at the same 
time we wish to represent the interests of this coun-
try.”70 Yılmaz Kahraman, representative for education 
for the Alevi Community in Germany (AABF), also 
underlines the importance of the “culture of Turkey”, 
by which he primarily means music, literature and 
cuisine. He rejects an “emotional orientation to the 
country of origin” and uncritical “ties” to Turkey, how-
ever, because this would go hand in hand with intoler-
ance towards minorities in Turkey. Nevertheless he 
regards it as important to preserve connections with 
Anatolia, the “country of origin of the Alevi religion”, 
and to the language of the place of origin. He rejects 
dual nationality because “you have to opt for one 
country”. Why should people originating in Turkey 
possess a privilege that Germans do not have, he asks. 
Oğuz Üçüncü, secretary general of the Millî Görüş 
Islamic Community (IGMG)71 at the time of the inter-
view, also emphasises the importance of maintaining 
connections to Turkey, the Turkish language and 
cultural identity. The work of IGMG is principally in 
Germany; in accordance with this, Üçüncü criticises 
the polarisation and division of people from Turkey 
according to political and social conflicts in Turkey. 
69  Ute Rasche, “Türken-Sprecher”, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 5 February 2014, 8. 
70  Interview with Kenan Kolat, chairman of the TGD, on 
13 September 2013 in Berlin-Kreuzberg. 
71  IGMG is one of the most controversial communities of 
Turkish Islam in Germany. Reports for protection of the con-
stitution have always portrayed a strictly organised commu-
nity whose first aim is to establish a theocracy in Turkey and 
whose long-term aim is “Islamic rule of the world”. For the 
intermediate period it aims to establish “structures of a paral-
lel society”. In the view of the migration researcher and Milli 
Görüş expert Werner Schiffauer, by contrast, the IGMG is a 
transnational religious community of migrant workers with 
a complex relationship to Germany and Turkey; see Schiffauer, 
“Die Islamische Gemeinde Milli Görüş” (see note 51): 67. 
SWP Berlin 
The New Turkish Diaspora Policy 
October 2014 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Diaspora policy as an issue for conflict 
In this connection he refers to the protests in Gezi 
Park in Turkey in summer 2013, which also caused 
controversy among Turkish migrants in Germany and 
their families. The DİDF, by contrast, regards the inte-
gration of people originating in Turkey primarily from 
socio-political and economic points of view, and puts 
the focus on participation in society and politics. 
Özlem Alev Demirel, co-chairman of the DİDF, plays 
down the importance of preserving cultural identity: 
the process of integration as merging together and 
decline in ties to the country of origin and its culture 
is natural and logical. He sees the right to vote and 
reduction of obstacles to acquiring citizenship as 
much more important than dual nationality. 
Yüksel Koç, co-chairman of the Federation of Kurd-
ish Associations in Germany (YEK-KOM) makes the 
criticism that Kurds in Germany are always subsumed 
under the members of the majority communities of 
their respective countries of origin, and that the Turk-
ish government’s support of the demand for dual 
nationality has the purpose of controlling people with 
origins in Turkey. YEK-KOM for its part does not believe 
that dual nationality is an indispensable instrument 
of integration. The decision should be left to the 
individual, it believes. Yüksel Koç supports EU mem-
bership for Turkey, however, as the fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen Criteria will in his opinion solve many 
problems in the field of human rights and minority 
rights in Turkey. While the Turkish state seeks to join 
the EU for economic reasons, in this connection the 
Kurdish associations are more interested in raising 
standards of living and democracy in Turkey. 
Diaspora policy as an issue for conflict 
Three positions can be distinguished in the attitude of 
the associations to Ankara’s diaspora policy: the IGMG 
adopts a critical position, while the DİDF, YEK-KOM 
and AABF dispute the relevance of a diaspora policy. 
The TGD questions the current diaspora policy but 
does not reject it in principle. Its position and that 
of the IGMG differ from the position of the DİDF and 
AABF in that they are in principle open to cooperation 
with Turkish state institutions. 
Oğuz Üçüncü (IGMG) does not favour a one-sided 
diaspora policy and expresses the criticism that Turkey 
is trying to regard people from Turkey “in a particular 
format”. However, he sees a strict policy of remaining 
at a distance as problematic. He does not categorically 
refuses to accept cooperation with Turkey and the 
work of the Turkish government: “There are still things 
[in Turkey, Y.A.] that affect me, which I wish to influ-
ence.” The Turkish government, however, should not 
pursue its “diaspora policy” against host countries but 
must do so in harmony with them. He believes that 
Turkey should not push special interests and must 
beware of seeing people originating in Turkey as “bar-
gaining counters”. Oğuz Üçüncü views the foundation 
of the YTB, of which he is a member of the advisory 
committee, as “positive in principle” because it con-
stitutes a “concentration of knowledge and expertise”. 
At the same time he opposes attempts to intervene 
by the YTB or the responsible minister of state, for 
example in the case of Turkish foster children. State-
ments by Turkish politicians such as “We won’t hand 
over our children to the Christians” are “completely 
out of place”. He argues that it is necessary to avoid 
the impression of being a Turkish “fifth column”. 
Kenan Kolat (TGD) has reservations about an active 
diaspora policy of Turkey and criticises a lack of trans-
parency. He comments that the exact nature of the 
Turkish diaspora policy is not known, as there is nei-
ther a paper stating its position nor a coherent strat-
egy perceptible behind the state’s actions. The current 
“diaspora policy” of Turkey, he believes, is a symbolic 
policy that does not contribute significantly to im-
proving the lives of people from Turkey in Germany. 
To attack the placing of Turkish children with German 
foster parents as “Christianisation” or “assimilation” 
is an example of the diaspora being used as an instru-
ment of domestic politics.72 
He believes it is understandable that the Turkish 
state is trying to intensify its relations to people from 
Turkey abroad and to motivate them for lobbying, but 
says that the TGD is interested in “constructive cooper-
ation” between Germany and Turkey: “What we need 
is not a diaspora policy but a policy of equality in 
Germany.” To establish a “German-Turkish council 
for consultation” to address problems at government 
level, would, in his view, make more sense than dias-
pora policy and lobbying. 
72  Carsten Hoffmann, “Türkische Pflegekinder: ‘Assimiliert 
und entfremdet’”, T-Online, 21 February 2013, http://www.t-
online.de/ nachrichten/ausland/eu/id_62260722/tuerkische-
pflegekinder-assimiliert-und-entfremdet-.html (accessed 
21 August 2014). In early 2013 the Turkish government and 
parliament examined the situation of Turkish foster children 
in states of the European Union and complained that thou-
sands of children had been “taken away from their parents 
and given to Christian families”. This case caused friction 
between Germany and Turkey. 
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The DİDF adopts a position of radical criticism 
of the Turkish state and government of Turkey and 
thus entirely rejects Turkish diaspora policy. Hasan 
Kamalak, a board member of DİDF, stated to the 
weekly newspaper Yeni Hayat that these government 
activities were part of preparations for the forthcom-
ing elections, and that the AKP government had not 
solved but worsened the problems of people from 
Turkey. Its diaspora policy, he said, ultimately met the 
demands of “capitalists”. A meeting of the government 
with migrant organisations was not consultation about 
the affairs of people originating in Turkey but about 
the interests of the AKP’s clientele, the organisations 
associated with it and “the rich”.73 The co-chairman of 
the DİDF, Özlem Alev Demirel, rejects all interference 
by Turkey in the “affairs of people from Turkey” and 
regards the diaspora policy as an attempt to make use 
of Turkish citizens living abroad and their offspring. 
In 2012, according to Yeni Hayat, representatives of 
the AABF also took part in the meeting of the YTB with 
migrant organisations from Germany. They stayed 
away from the subsequent meetings, it was reported, 
giving the reason that they had no say in the proceed-
ings. The secretary general at that time, Ali Doğan, 
described the conferences as the official Turkish politi-
cal leadership “making use of” people originating from 
Turkey.74 Yılmaz Kahraman, a board member of the 
AABF, also attributes to the YTB and Turkish diaspora 
policy the intention of taking over the migrant organi-
sations. He also sees a danger that the predominantly 
uncritical approach in Turkey to the dark sides of 
Turkish history will be transferred to Germany.75 
Yüksel Koç of the Federation of Kurdish Associa-
tions in Germany (YEK-KOM) also gives a negative 
assessment of the foreign and diaspora policy of 
73  “The AKP Dream of a Diaspora” (Turkish), Yeni Hayat, 28 
June 2012, http://www.yenihayat.de/haber/akpnin-diaspora-
hayali (accessed 10 October 2013). 
74  See also “The Turkish Diaspora Gathers in Istanbul” (Turk-
ish), Net Tavır, 18 November 2011, http://www.nettavir.com/ 
?islem=haberoku&id=3600 (accessed 27 February 2014). 
75  Between the AABF and Sunni organisations there are 
“hardly any points of contact beyond the aims of migration 
policy”. The AABF does not operate mosques and or hold 
Koran courses, but runs cultural centres which are known as 
Cemevi (Cem House) in which the Alevi religious ritual (Cem) 
is carried out. In addition to a women’s and youth organisa-
tion the AABF has established a burial fund especially for 
Alevi which can be used for repatriation and burial of the 
bodies of Alevi in Turkey, Şevket Küçükhüseyin, Türkische 
Politische Organisationen in Deutschland, Zukunftsforum Politik 
no. 45 (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2002), 30. 
Turkey, to which he attributes “anti-Kurdish” tenden-
cies. He believes its purpose is to discredit Kurdish 
organisations in Germany and manipulate the German 
public and people from Turkey living here. Ankara’s 
diaspora policy, he states, is neither in the interest of 
Turkey nor that of the people whom it addresses. By 
means of regular diaspora meetings in Ankara, in his 
view, Turkey aims to take over the institutions of people 
originating in Turkey and harness them to the policy 
of the AKP, as is demonstrated by the absence of invita-
tions to associations with a critical attitude, among 
other things. 
There are three essential reasons for the reserva-
tions of most umbrella organisations of people from 
Turkey towards Ankara’s current diaspora policy. 
1. Conflicts of interest, for example in the case of 
Kurdish organisations, whose primary purpose is to 
induce the Turkish government to introduce more 
democracy and to allow more rights to the Kurdish 
population in Turkey. 2. Fear of increased control and 
take-over by the Turkish government of the organisa-
tions originating in Turkey, especially in the cases 
of the Alevi, Kurdish and oppositional associations. 
3. The wish to retain institutional autonomy, which 
the associations believe is threatened by active dias-
pora policy. 
The Turkish government’s limited 
opportunities for intervention 
Despite some convergence between the interests of 
the migrant organisations and the aims of Turkish 
diaspora policy, the community of Turkish origin in 
Germany is characterised by political and social frag-
mentation. Competing identities and conflicting loyal-
ties put limits on the Turkish government’s capability 
of intervening and controlling.76 
Because in the past they were themselves the target 
of mobilisation by right-wing conservative forces, lib-
eral left-wing as well as radical left groups are opposed 
to or at least sceptical about an active diaspora policy. 
Due to their attitude, these associations remain out-
side the Turkish government’s reach and its capabili-
ties to control and mobilise, and even cooperation 
with them is out of the question. Secular liberal and 
left-wing organisations reject the diaspora policy and 
cooperation with the AKP government because of the 
76  Akçay and Alimukhamedov, “Revaluating Contemporary 
Diaspora” (see note 56): 112. 
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The Turkish government’s limited opportunities for intervention 
Islamic background and anti-democratic tendencies 
of the Turkish leadership. Although this leadership 
continues to try to influence people from Turkey and 
their associations in Germany, it is increasingly losing 
capabilities of control and influence due to domestic 
socio-cultural differences and the political fragmenta-
tion of the diaspora. Bearing in mind the conservative 
rhetoric of the persons driving Turkish diaspora 
policy, their scope for appealing to Alevi, Kurds, secu-
lar people from Turkey and the Christian minorities 
is extremely limited. 
The prospect of rallying the migrant community 
against activities “hostile to the state” seems to be un-
promising in view of political differences, even among 
people of Turkish origin with a Turkish ethnic and 
Sunni background. According to the police, 25,000 
people from Germany and neighbouring states at-
tended the mass meeting “Respect for Democracy”, 
which the Union of European Turkish Democrats 
(UETD), which is close to the AKP, held in July 2013 in 
Düsseldorf to support the government during the Gezi 
Park protests. This relatively poor turnout and the 
non-participation of the IGMG, although it shares the 
tradition of and comes from the same milieu as the 
Turkish party of government AKP, do not suggest 
a strong ability of the AKP government to achieve 
mobilisation in the diaspora. 
Evidence of the AKP government’s limited ability to 
mobilise is also the low participation of Turks abroad 
in the presidency elections on 10 August 2014. Of 2.8 
million persons who were entitled to vote, only a little 
over half a million went to the polls; 230,938 voted 
abroad in specially installed polling stations, 295,621 
cast their votes in customs offices and airports. Com-
pared with the aim of gaining at least a million votes 
in the diaspora for Erdoğan, the result – 143,873 valid 
votes for the prime minister – was far below the expec-
tations of the AKP. In Germany the voters’ turnout of 
only 8.1 per cent was also low. Approximately 76,000 
votes were cast for Erdoğan, around 26,000 and 8,000 
respectively for his rivals Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and 
Selahattin Demirtaş. This is, however, not to say that 
a separation from Turkey of people in Germany origi-
nating in Turkey or a weakening of transnational con-
nections to Turkey is evident. Nevertheless, the low 
turnout to vote shows unmistakably how limited are 
the capability to act and the influence of the Turkish 
government, the new diaspora policy that it initiated, 
and the opposition in Ankara. 
The realisation that the diaspora communities can-
not be influenced from outside as desired is based on 
three factors in the case of the diaspora of people of 
Turkish origin. Firstly there are alternative political, 
religious and ethnic orientations that are not subject 
to official Turkish national culture. Secondly the migrant 
organisations have evolved from having aims that are 
oriented to their country of origin to having aims ori-
ented to the countries in which they reside,77 and 
are not willing to relinquish their autonomy vis-à-vis 
Turkey. And thirdly the Alevi and Kurdish migrant 
organisations have their own interests, which are 
different from or contrary to those of their country 
of origin. In Germany the Alevi have an official status 
that has been denied them in Turkey: the Alevi con-
fession has official recognition, and in several states 
of the Federal Republic of Germany Alevi religious 
instruction is even offered in public schools and the 
Alevi can express themselves politically in a democ-
ratic environment. In view of their fight for further 
democratisation, secularisation and recognition of 
the Alevi confession in Turkey, cooperation of Alevi 
associations in Germany with the AKP government 
in the context of a diaspora policy is unlikely, at least 
under the existing political circumstances. Kurdish 
organisations in turn are primarily concerned with 
drawing attention to the situation of the Kurds in 
Turkey and the curtailment of their rights there. As 
long as the Kurdish problem remains unsolved in 
Turkey, the PKK has not laid down its arms and there 
is no political agreement about a collective identity 
that includes Kurds, there will be no cooperation in 
Germany. With other umbrella associations, too, the 
capacity of the Turkish government to exert influence 
will remain limited.78 
77  For a detailed discussion, see Argun, Turkey in Germany 
(see note 13). 
78  Attempts by the Turkish government to influence the 
political organisations of Bulgarian Turks also failed. Despite 
a voting recommendation, the “Freedom and Dignity” party, 
supported by the Turkish government, which is directed 
towards voters of Turkish origin in Bulgaria, gained only 1.6 
per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections in May 2013, 
while the established “Movement for Rights and Freedoms” 
achieved 11.3 per cent. In the opinion of Michael Martens, 
who writes for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, this result 
contradicts “the accusation often made in nationalist circles 
in Bulgaria that the Bulgarian Turks are Ankara’s fifth col-
umn”, a conclusion that can also be taken as valid for the 
Turkish diaspora in Germany and the Turkish diaspora poli-
cy; Michael Martens, “Kolonne fünf antwortet nicht”, Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 May 2013, 6. 
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Turkish Diaspora Policy – Consequences, Reactions and Controversies 
New players in the diaspora of people from 
Turkey: the UETD and CHP 
The Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) is 
seen as a lobby association of the Turkish party in 
government, AKP, even though representatives of the 
organisation deny this. The present chairman, Süley-
man Çelik, emphasises that the UETD has no “organic 
ties” to the AKP, but merely maintains good relations 
to government circles and thus fulfils an important 
“transmission function”. In the German media the 
UETD is accused “camouflaging” its true intentions 
and of using migrants for its own purposes.79 Its im-
portance for the AKP government results from the 
limited capability, described above, to influence the 
umbrella organisations of originating in Turkey. 
Before the Turkish elections, the UETD campaigned 
for the AKP and organised the controversial appear-
ances of the Turkish prime minister Erdoğan in 
Cologne in 2008, in Düsseldorf in 2011 and recently 
in the Tempodrom in Berlin and the Lanxess-Arena in 
Cologne in February and May 2014 respectively. Ac-
cording to Çelik, the UETD was founded in 2004 by 
“people originating in Turkey from various profes-
sions” with the purpose of “improving the social and 
political status of Turks in Germany”. The UETD aims 
at political participation by people from Turkey as a 
first step, followed by cultural participation as a sec-
ond step. In summer 2013 it organised a rally in Düs-
seldorf under the slogan “Respect for Democracy”, in 
order to support Erdoğan against the nationwide wave 
of demonstrations in Turkey. 
The Republican People’s Party (CHP) also has the 
aim of basing its organisation on people from Turkey 
in Europe. The party vice-chairman Gürsel Tekin con-
firmed this intention at interview and explained the 
expectations that the CHP associates with this: “We 
will directly perceive the problems of people originat-
ing in Turkey, follow European politics closely and 
intensify our relations to social democratic parties in 
Europe”.80 For many German politicians such a strat-
egy is not in the interests of integration and the politi-
cal participation of people from Turkey. A local poli-
tician from Hamburg expressed his concerns in this 
respect, and in an interview a member of the Bundes-
tag expressed his reservations vis-à-vis the organisa-
79  Cf. here for example Pascal Beucker, “Instrumentalisierte 
Migranten”, taz, 7 July 2013, http://www.taz.de/Pro-Erdogan-
Demo-/!119445/ (accessed 4 February 2014). 
80  Interview of Tekin by the author on 23 March 2013 in 
Hamburg. 
tional efforts of the CHP. Gürsel Tekin admitted that 
misunderstandings could arise, but believes that they 
can easily be overcome. It remains to be seen how far 
the UETD and CHP can be successful as diaspora asso-
ciations and how far the CHP can establish itself as a 
rival to the UETD. 
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Conclusions and Implications for German Decision-Makers 
 
Turkey’s diaspora policy is the result of the Turkish 
government’s increasing interest in people from 
Turkey. The causes of the new diaspora policy strategy 
in turn are less to be sought in the ideology of the AKP 
government than in new global circumstances that 
make it necessary for Turkey to reposition itself in 
international relations and to use for the country the 
economic and political potential of people originating 
in Turkey scattered across the world. The diaspora of 
people from Turkey in Germany has gained political 
weight in recent years and has enormous prospects for 
development that are in line with the economic inter-
ests of Turkish foreign policy. The aims of the new 
Turkish diaspora policy, to strengthen the associations 
of people from Turkey in Europe and to extend their 
scope for action pose a number of challenges for Ger-
man foreign policy. 
One challenge is that, due to the transnational 
interlinking of Germany and Turkey and the intensify-
ing contacts of the Turkish government to the dias-
pora in Germany, a clear separation of German domes-
tic and foreign policy is hardly possible any longer. 
The federal government’s policy towards Turkey is 
simultaneously a domestic political matter, and the 
integration policy towards people from Turkey is in 
turn often a subject for German foreign policy. This 
forces the German government to shape its policy on 
Turkey and on integration as a balancing act between 
considerations of domestic policy and foreign-policy 
interests. 
However, this also results in opportunities for Ger-
man integration policy, as a principal aim of Ankara’s 
diaspora policy is to encourage the integration of 
people originating from Turkey in order to strengthen 
their scope for action and political influence. On his 
controversial visits to Germany, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
then Turkish prime minister, several times called on 
people from Turkey to make better use of opportunities 
for education in Germany, to gain a higher social 
status, to take part in the life of society and to engage 
in political activity. All of this can only be achieved if 
people from Turkey adopt modern ways of behaviour 
and an open attitude. To this extent, Turkish diaspora 
policy – despite its affirmation of conservative social 
values – complements the integration policy of the 
German federal government and the efforts to inte-
grate made by people originating in Turkey. However 
it also holds the danger – precisely because of its con-
servative social values – of reinforcing cultural frag-
mentation within the diaspora in Germany. This 
fragmentation for its part puts clear limits on the 
attempts of the Turkish government to intervene and 
control. The “new” Turkish diaspora policy and the 
rhetoric that accompanies it is not able to appeal to 
the diaspora in Germany in its diversity. 
German decision-makers should recognise that the 
trend for people from Turkey to turn increasingly to 
Germany in political matters will continue, in spite of 
the strong interest of the Turkish state to tie German 
Turks to Turkey. There is important evidence for this 
in the interest expressed by members of the umbrella 
organisations of people originating in Turkey and the 
explicit endeavours of the associations to exploit their 
potential resources in Germany. Inclusion of these 
umbrella organisations among the recipients of public 
financial support will hold the diaspora associations 
to account for the activities of their organisations, 
which will strengthen their autonomy towards their 
country of origin and the pressure to assimilate. Ger-
man decision-makers should, however, also be aware 
that people from Turkey in Germany will maintain 
their cross-border connections, and they should accept 
the transnational orientation of these people, which 
relates to both the country of origin and the country 
of residence and corresponds to the everyday reality of 
most of them in Germany. 
It is also necessary for the responsible persons in 
the Federal Republic to abandon ideas that regard the 
diaspora as a “fifth column” or “exterritorial expan-
sion” of the country of origin and see transnational 
links as an obstacle to integration. Diaspora structures 
and transnational ties fulfil important bridge and 
transmission functions which are also in the interest 
of the host country. Furthermore, in an age of global 
communication technologies it is impossible to pre-
vent migrants from having a relationship to their 
homeland. 
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Abbreviations 
Abbreviations 
AABF Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu  
(Alevi Community in Germany) 
AABK Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu  
(European Union of Alevi Communities) 
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi  
(Party for Justice and Development) 
AnaP Anavatan Partisi  
(Motherland Party) 
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi  
(Republican People’s Party) 
DEIK Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu  
(Committee for Foreign Economic Relations) 
DİB Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı  
(Presidium for Religious Affairs) 
DİDF Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu  
(Federation of Democratic Workers’ Associations) 
DIK Deutsche Islam-Konferenz  
(German Islamic Conference) 
DİTİB Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birlığı  
(Turkish Islamic Union of the State Office of 
Religious Affairs) 
DSP Demokratik Sol Parti  
(Democratic Left Party) 
EU European Union 
GG Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 
IGMG İslam Toplumu Millî Görüş  
(Islamic Community Millî Görüş) 
IKMB İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği  
(Association of Islamic Cultural Centres in Germany) 
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 
(Party of the Nationalist Movement) 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan  
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 
TGD Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland  
(Turkish Community in Germany) 
TİKA Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı 
(Turkish Presidium for International Cooperation and 
Coordination) 
TOBB Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği  
(Association of Turkish Exchanges and 
Chambers of Trade) 
UETD Avrupalı Türk Demokratlar Birliği  
(Union of European Turkish Democrats) 
YEK-KOM Yekitîya Komalên Kurd Li Elmanya/Almanya Kürt 
Dernekleri Federasyonu 
(Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany) 
YEKM Yunus Emre Kültür Merkezi  
(Yunus Emre Cultural Centre) 
YEV Yunus Emre Vakfı  
(Yunus Emre Foundation) 
YTB Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı 
(Office for Turks Abroad and Related Communities) 
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